139
32
With regard to the anti-aircraft platoon, he says it had been fully instructed in mechanism, drill and tactical handling of both the Lewis and Bren guns, but no firing had been done.
These are the main features of Colonel Sutcliffe's report. In concluding he says, in speaking of his battalion:-
Their many and varied duties did, however, furnish both the Officers and O.R's with a far more extensive general training than this report would indicate. In the matter of drill and general deportment their standard is high, and in spite of the many months (15 in all) of monotonous duties, during which time they had no leave, the morale, discipline, and esprit de corps have been maintained at a very high level.
To such a body of men which had been mobilized for practically two years, one can apply with confidence the evidence of General Stuart, the present Chief of the General Staff:
A. That is a point that has been concerning me with respect to most of the evidence I have heard. I feel that the evidence I have heard so far has been trying to bring out just the condition of the battalions, and chiefly the Winnipeg Grenadiers in respect to their individual and sub-unit training. Q. Undoubtedly the emphasis has been placed on that?-A. All the way through, sir. Now, that is only part of the training of a unit, my lord; that is superficial. What takes a lengthy time in training a unit is giving the unit something like character, and perhaps the best way I can explain it is this
Q. Individuality and character?-A. Collective character. The train- ing is broken up into three components; the first component is the moral component; the second component is the mental component; and the third component is the physical component. And of those three I put far and away the greatest weight on the moral component.
As to the moral component, it is true it is an indirect approach, but nevertheless there are certain characteristics that we try to develop in the individual: First of all, loyalty; secondly, confidence. By loyalty I mean loyalty to those working with him, to those under him, and to those above him. As to confidence, the same: determination, sense of duty, moral courage. Give me a unit that has got those attributes, and I could whack it into shape in no time.
Q. There was a favourite phrase years ago that seems to have gone out of fashion, namely, esprit de corps?-A. Absolutely; I am coming to that, sir. You may say that the summation of those moral character- istics is what is commonly referred to as morale.
Q. Yes. A. Now, on the mental side you have got judgment, con- stant mental alertness, readiness to accept responsibility.
Q. Yes.-A. Then on the physical side you have the need to develop a healthy body that can give effect to the great demands on the spirit and on the mind. Every single thing that a unit does is an indirect approach to the development of those various characteristics. I do not care what it is. That is why I, in the early days of the war used to lose patience with people who would come into my office and complain: "What can we do when we have not got equipment?" Even if they have no equipment they can get the really hard and difficult part of the training done without it. Those are the most difficult things to accomplish, and take the greatest length of time. I maintain that if they are brought out on the moral side and the mental side, these alleged shortcomings that we have heard about, which are all very simple and do not take very long to adjust, can be adjusted; and I am quite convinced they could have been adjusted in this particular case in the time that was available to them.
33
Now, what are the requirements. In respect to those two units, they had experienced commanders; they were well officered; as far as I knew they did the job that they were on thoroughly and well. All right, if they did their job well and there were no complaints about it, those characteristics that I have been talking about must have been developed. In other words, they were good units, well tried units, and if that is so it is more than 75 per cent of the battle.
Q. Then your opinion is, from what you have said, that any weapon training or anything of that sort that these units may have been short in as laid down in the books, could have been made up prior to the 8th December?-A. I not only think it, I know it.
For some considerable time since the outbreak of war in 1939 Canada has beensending troops to England, and since June, 1940, England has been under direct threat of invasion. In October, 1941, there was no war in the Pacific. Speaking of the troops sent to England from June to September, 1940, Lt.-Col. Sparling, Staff Officer in the Directorate of Military Training at National Defence Headquarters who had gone overseas with the Second Canadian Division, said that in his opinion the training of both the Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers was far ahead of the units of the Second Division at the time they proceeded overseas. In speaking of the two battalions in question in comparison with other battalions in Canada in September, 1941, Colonel Sparling said that, from an examination of the training reports, they were the equal of any other unit. It is to be borne in mind that these battalions had an advantage over other battalions in Canada in the experience which they respectively had in Newfoundland and the West Indies, not enjoyed by battalions which had not been out of the country; and it seems proper to call attention to the fact that both these battalions had enjoyed the advantage of having virtually the same men, trained by the same officers and N.C.O's for a long period overseas.
General Crerar had knowledge of the equipment and state of training of the units in the Canadian army. He says:-
Detailed statement of supplies and issues of weapons and equipment to units of Canadian army, and also of state of their training, were prepared monthly under the direction of the Vice Chief of the General Staff, copies of which came to me.
He further says, as regards these units:-
140
To the best of my knowledge and experience, however, no battalions of any army, even if fully equipped, can ever be regarded as completely trained. Training is an unceasing process. There were, however, in Canada at the time in question a number of battalions (among which were Royal Rifles and Winnipeg Grenadiers) which, although somewhat handicapped by lack of supplies of certain platoon weapons (mortars and anti-tank rifles) in my opinion were generally adequately trained to undertake defensive respon- sibilities such those in prospect in Hong Kong,
It should be recalled that General Crerar had personal knowledge of the Royal Rifles as the result of two inspections, one in the autumn of 1940 and one in the early summer of 1941, as he mentions in his evidence; and that he had first hand knowledge of the Winnipeg Grenadiers from his interviews with Brigadier Kay, as he also mentions in his evidence. This knowledge led him to believe, as he states in his recommendation, that the experience of these battalions in Newfoundland and the West Indies respectively would be of "no small value" to them in their new role in Hong Kong. It was evidently General Crerar's opinion that these two battalions were specially qualified to adopt themselves to the conditions awaiting them in Hong Kong. He says:--
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.